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I. INTRODUCTION 
Respondents Jerome County and South View Dairy take a variety of approaches in 
attempting to rebut the arguments put forth by Friends of Minidoka (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as "Friends") in its opening brief. These approaches include rhetorical questioning, 
shallow reasoning, and an abundant use of block quoting. But not once do the Respondents 
actually address the legal authorities cited by appellants. Nor do they deal with the facts of this 
case, instead opting to employ willful blindness throughout their briefs. When confronted with 
binding law and the compelling record of this case, it becomes readily apparent that appellants 
are entitled to a reversal of the District Court's decision, including vacating the decision of the 
Jerome County Board of Commissioners (hereinafter the "Board") to approve the Big Sky LCO 
permit. 
II. THE APPELLANT-ORGANIZATIONS HA VE STANDING. 
South View's and Jerome County's arguments about standing distort the substantive 
allegations contained in Friends' standing affidavits and conflate multiple legal standards. 
Rather than rebut the authority cited by Friends, the respondents rhetorically question the 
standing of ICARE, IRC, and Friends of Minidoka. This strategy proves futile, however, in the 
face of binding law and compelling facts. 
A. The Appellant-Organizations have Statutory Standing. 
Friends have made a sufficient showing to be conferred statutory standing under the Local 
Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA"), I.C. § 67-6501 et seq. Pursuant to I.C. § 67-6521, only 
"affected persons" have standing to seek judicial review of local land use decisions. An 
"affected person" is one "having a bona fide interest in real property which may be adversely 
affected" by a challenged land use decision. I.C. § 67-6521(l)(a) (emphasis added). This Court 
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has held that the mere allegation that offensive odors could potentially travel 3.4 miles and onto a 
party's land was sufficient for that party to be considered "adversely affected." Davisco Foods 
Intern., Inc. v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784, 787 (2005). Thus, the threshold to obtain 
statutory standing under LLUP A is much lower than that proffered by the respondents. 
The affidavits provided by Friends easily meet this standard by describing how individual 
members of the organizations owned, lived, and worked on real property in close proximity to 
the Big Sky site. See Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 25-26 (hereinafter "Appellants' Brief') 
(detailing member interests in real property located adjacent to and nearby Big Sky). These 
affidavits went on to detail the specific types of harms threatened by Big Sky. See id. (harms 
include, inter alia, nuisance odors, fly infestations, and groundwater and surface water pollution). 
Respondents' attenuated arguments ignore the plain language and inescapable import of 
the affidavits. Friends have expressly stated (1) that their members maintain interests in real 
property located adjacent to and nearby the Big Sky property, and (2) that these members will 
suffer harm from issuance of the permit. This is all that I.e. § 67-6521 requires. 
B. The Appellant-Organizations have Constitutional Standing. 
Jerome County and South View concede all elements of representational standing, except 
for the requirement that the appellant-organizations' individual members suffer a distinct and 
palpable "injury-in-fact" as a result of the Board's decision. See South View's Brief, pp. 12, 14; 
Jerome County's Brief, pp. 7-10. 1 The case law cited by Friends in their opening brief, however, 
demonstrates that issuance of the Big Sky permit does threaten distinct injury that is not shared 
1 South View purports that ICARE and IRC are "seeking to assert rights of third persons and 
should be estopped as named parties[.]" South View's Brief, p. 14. This argument showcases a 
deep misunderstanding of representational (or associational) standing and third-party standing. 
Both doctrines are exceptions to the general rule that a party must assert his own legaJ rights and 
interests. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). Thus, even ifICARE and IRC were 
asserting third-party standing, which they are not, that would not be grounds for dismiss'al. 
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alike by all citizens in the jurisdiction. Appellants' Brief, pp. 23-25. South View and Jerome 
County make no attempt to rebut this law, instead opting to distort the allegations contained in 
Friends' affidavits. 
It goes without question that standing may be predicated upon a "threatened harm." 
Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772 (2006). In this instance, issuance of the Big Sky permit 
threatens to negatively impact Friends' interests in the aesthetic and recreational integrity of the 
Minidoka Site, the use and enjoyment of members' private real property, and the members' 
physical well-being. See Appellants' Brief, pp. 26-27; Aff. of Momohara, ~ 9; Aff. of Carlson, 
pp. 1-2; Aff. of Hasse, ~ 7. Threatened injuries such as these are universally held as 
constitutionally sound. See, e.g., Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 
cases). 
Furthermore, the injury threatened by Big Sky is not shared alike by all citizens in the 
jurisdiction. Even if it were, if all people were significantly impacted, that would provide 
constitutional standing to all. us. v. S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973) ("To deny standing to 
persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean ... 
government actions could be questioned by nobody."). The difference lies between generalized, 
perhaps hard to define, grievances versus the specific types of injuries that are clearly defined in 
this case. Rather than being generalized grievances, the harm threatened by Big Sky affects most 
directly those individuals living in proximity to the proposed CAFO and those citizens who visit 
and value the Minidoka Site for its recreational, historical, and aesthetic qualities. This Court 
has upheld standing on broader grounds when it found that term limit pledges placed on every 
state election ballot caused a distinct injury only to those citizens opposing term limits, even 
though the ballots reached every citizen in the jurisdiction. See Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for 
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Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 125 (2000). Here, the injury threatened by Big Sky befalls a 
smaller, more distinct, and more identifiable subsection of the citizenry than in Van Valkenburgh. 
Thus, Friends have adequately alleged that their members' interests are threatened by approval of 
the Big Sky permit. This is all that constitutional standing requires. 
C. Whether Friends' Substantial Rights are Prejudiced Goes to Remedies. 
Pursuant to I.e. § 67-6535, only those challenges which demonstrate "actual harm or 
violation of fundamental rights" are entitled to a judicial remedy under LLUPA. In its brief, 
South View conflates this standard with the requirements for standing. South View's Brief, p. 
11. Judge Elgee explicitly rejected this argument, finding that the right to a remedy is a distinct 
legal issue from standing. Elgee Dec., p. 19. Additionally, Friends have demonstrated that the 
County's actions throughout the Big Sky saga did harm their fundamental rights. Appellants' 
Brief, pp. 32 n. 14,37-38,42 n. 20. No dispute has been raIsed as to this issue. 
Moreover, this Court recently enunciated that, in examining whether neighbors' 
substantial rights will be prejudiced by a county's land use decision, it is proper to look at issues 
such as whether the challenged decision would decrease property values or interfere with the use 
or ownership of land. Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. of Comm 'rs, 151 Idaho 228, _, 254 
P .3d 1224, 1229 (2011). These issues are independent of due process violations, which also 
prejudices substantial rights for the purposes of I.C. § 67-5279. Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 150 
Idaho 30, 36 (2010) (due process rights are substantial rights). Here, Friends' substantial rights 
were prejudiced by (1) the unconstitutional limitations imposed by the County on their due 
process rights, and (2) the deleterious impacts the Big Sky CAFO would have on their private 
property rights and the Minidoka site. See, e.g., Phase I, Trans., pp. 46-50,58-61,63-65, 73-76, 
81-84,90-93,217-219,220-223,240-242,299-301, 303-305 (detailing how Big Sky CAFO 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF Page 7 
would decrease property values, cause fly infestations, impact air and water quality, and cause 
significant health problems). Clearly, Friends' rights are "in jeopardy of suffering substantial 
harmifthe project goes forward." Hawkins, 254 P.3d at 1229. 
III. FRIENDS' PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED. 
South View and Jerome County paint the Big Sky hearing as "extraordinary," allowing 
"any person" to participate "wholesale" with "unrestricted input" before the Board. Jerome 
County's Brief, p. 12; South View's Brief, pp. 19,23. In making these arguments, the 
respondents casually ignore the core tenet of procedural due process: that the opportunity to 
present and rebut evidence must occur at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Cowan 
v. Board ofComm 'rs o/Freemont County, 143 Idaho 501, 512 (2006). The focus of this 
standard is not on the number of individuals allowed to participate in a public hearing, but rather 
on the manner and quality ofthe participation afforded. Here, the public's opportunity to present 
and rebut evidence during the Big Sky hearing was severely limited. Many of the people who 
wished to comment on the 500+ page application were limited to one single-sided sheet of paper 
and four minutes of oral testimony or, if that person elected not to testify, two single-sided sheets 
of paper. These limitations do not comport with due process. 
Jerome County argues that, under Cowan, these procedures were constitutionally sound 
because this Court "ultimately found" the two-minute limitation in Cowan constitutionally 
acceptable. Jerome County's Brief, p. 11. Rather than finding a two-minute limitation 
acceptable, however, this Court unequivocally wrote that "limiting public comment to two 
minutes is not consistent with affording an individual a meaningful opportunity to be heard." 
Cowan, 143 Idaho at 512. Here, Friends are challenging the opportunity to meaningfully 
participate in the Big Sky hearing as a whole. The Board's limitations at the hearing left Friends 
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without any meaningful opportunity to present evidence concerning the negative impacts of 
CAFOs and the problems posed by the proposed 13,000 head operation. Only certain 
landowners who resided within one mile of the site were allowed the ability to submit substantial 
written testimony, and even then only if they did so within 15 days of official notice. 
The County also contends that no constitutional violation occurred because Friends have 
not identified any specific member who was denied a meaningful opportunity to present or rebut 
evidence. Jerome County's Brief, p. 13. This argument is clearly contradicted by the record. 
For instance, ICARE members Brenda Herrmann (Phase I, Trans., p. 209), Lee Halper (id. at 89), 
Dick Helsley (id. at 241), ICARE Director Alma Hasse (id. at 193-95; 259-64; 270-71), and IRC 
members Harold Dimond (id. at 221) and Eden Dimond (id. at 228) were all denied a meaningful 
opportunity to present and rebut evidence in violation of their due process rights during the 
hearing.2 
South View makes a variety of scattershot arguments in asserting that no procedural due 
process violations occurred.3 First, it echoes Judge Elgee's erroneous conclusion that the Board 
liberalized its ordinances to allow for unlimited written testimony prior to the hearing. South 
View's Brief, p. 22. Judge Elgee's finding on this matter was a clear error oflaw. Appellants' 
Brief, pp. 31-32 (amendments to JCZO,allowed unlimited testimony to be submitted up to seven 
2 Jerome County accuses Friends of making the "outrageous" claim that the Dimonds were not 
allowed to present written testimony prior to the hearing. Jerome County's Bri ef, p. 13. The 
County fails to comprehend that multiple Dimond families are involved in this dispute. While 
Dean Dimond was allowed to submit written testimony prior to the hearing, his parents, Harold 
and Carolyn Dimond were not. Appellants' Brief, p. 29; Phase I, Trans., pp. 220-21. Even 
though they owned, but did not reside on, land adjacent to the Big Sky site, the County refused to 
accept their written comments. 
3 In response to Friends' procedural due process arguments, South View cites and applies the 
numerous standards governing judicial review oflocalland use decisions. South View's Brief, 
pp. 20-22. How this line of argument is relevant to the County's violation of procedural due 
process, however, is left unexplained by South View. 
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days prior to hearing, but effective date of ordinance rendered it inapplicable to Big Sky hearing). 
Thus, South View's belief that anyone could submit unlimited written testimony prior to the 
hearing is simply wrong. 
Second, South View incorrectly states that Friends had a "spokesman" at the hearing. 
South View's Brief, p. 23. The record does not support this contention. First, the alleged 
"spokesman" present at Big Sky hearings was not an official representative or agent of any 
plaintiff in this proceeding, and therefore could not afford appellants' their due process rights. 
Second, the "spokesman" did not get "substantially equal time" as the opponent. Big Sky 
representatives were given significantly more time and leniency than any of the opposition. See, 
e.g., Phase I, Trans., pp. 94-98, 244-5 (Don McFarland); pp. 98-142, 245-48 (Matt Thompson, 
engineer for Big Sky); pp. 3-13,26, 71-2, 97, 110-11, 128, 140-41, 146-47, 167-178, 188-196, 
204-09,251,257-260,265-67,277,286-88,297-98, 318-326, 333 (John Lothspeich). 
In total, the opposing parties' arguments are nothing more than specious attempts to 
direct the Court's attention away from the pertinent facts of this case. Friends could not 
reasonably and meaningfully participate in the Big Sky public hearing in the time and space 
allotted by the Board. As such, the limitations did not comport with due process. 
IV. THE SLONES' PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED. 
Jerome County violated the Slones' procedural due process rights in three ways: (1) 
failing to serve them with timely actual notice of the September 25-26 Big Sky hearing; (2) 
failing to provide them with actual notice of a hearing where the sufficiency of the corrected 
notice they received and the adequacy of their opportunity to present and rebut evidence were at 
issue; and (3) failing to make a transcribable, verbatim transcript of that later hearing. The 
respondents take issue with only the first of these issues, and therefore concede that the County 
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violated the Slones' procedural due process rights in the other two instances. 
As to the Slones' entitlement and receipt of actual notice, the arguments put forth by 
Jerome County and South View are unavailing. Both parties attempt to show that the Siones 
received four different types of notice concerning the hearing. Jerome County's Brief, pp. 15-17; 
South View's Brief, pp. 26-27. But while there may have been constructive notice of the hearing 
through indirect means, that alone does not cure the County's failure to provide the Slones with 
actual and timely mailed notice, as required by the County's ordinance and the Constitution. 
Indeed, neither party rebuts the case law cited by Friends, which holds that constructive notice is 
never constitutional except in those rare instances where the affected party is not "reasonably 
identifiable." Appellants' Brief, p. 36. 
Jerome County also advances two implausible arguments to suggest that (1) the LCO 
ordinance did not require notice of a hearing to be sent to the Slones, and (2) even if it did, the 
pertinent provisions of the JCZO do not contain timing requirements for notice. Jerome 
County's Brief, pp. 18-22. The notice ordinance in question, JCZO 13-6.01, reads: 
The Planning & Zoning Administrator shall cause a Notice of the filing of an application 
for a LCO Permit to be published in a newspaper of general circulation in Jerome County, 
Idaho. The Administrator shall also send the notice by mail to all property owners within 
one mile o/the boundaries o/the contiguous property owned by the applicant o/the 
proposed LCO pursuant to Idaho Code 67-6529. The property owner shall be 
responsible to forward Notice of Hearing to all primary residents on the property. The 
applicant for the LCO Pennit, in addition to the application fee, shall pay all costs of 
publication and notice. (Emphasis added). 
The County interprets this ordinance as requiring notice of the "filing of an application" to be 
sent to property owners within one mile of the proposed CAFO location. Jerome County's Brief, 
p. 19. This interpretation is untenable. The second sentence of the ordinance specifically 
references I.C. § 67-6529, which governs local public hearings procedures for CAFO pennitting. 
By inserting this language, the drafters of the ordinance plainly required "all property owners 
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within one mile" of the proposed site, such as the Slones, to receive an individual notice 
containing the statutory requirements for LCO public hearings. Moreover, the County's 
interpretation renders the third sentence of the ordinance meaningless. That sentence instructs 
the property owner to forward the "Notice of Hearing" to all "primary residents" on the property. 
The term "primary residents" again references I.C. § 67-6529, which restricts participation at 
LCO public hearings to those with a "primary residence" within one-mile of the proposed site. 
Thus, the "notice" that eligible landowners receive must be a "Notice of Hearing," because the 
landowner is directed by the ordinance to forward the notice to the exclusive group of individuals 
("primary residents") who are authorized under the statute to participate in LCO public hearings.4 
The County also attempts to construe the ordinance such that it contains no timing 
requirement. Jerome County's Brief, p. 19. Such a construction is indefensible. The first 
sentence of JCZO 13-6.01 clearly sets up the timeline of events. First, an LCO application is 
filed with the County. Second, the Planning & Zoning Administrator publishes notice of the 
filing of the application in a newspaper of general circulation. Finally, the Administrator "shall 
also" mail notice of the hearing to property owners within one-mile of the proposed site. The 
proximity of the term "shall also" to the sentence instructing the Administrator to publish notice 
of the filing of the application clearly indicates that these requirements are concurrent. In fact, 
this timeline of events is close to the actual procedure followed by the Planning & Zoning 
Administrator in this case. See Phase I, AR, p. 46 (Exhibit marked S44, Electronic Rec., p. 991). 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the ordinance itself contains no specific timing 
requirement, then timeliness must necessarily depend on the date that notice was actually sent to 
4 In fact, the County never mailed or published a "Notice of the filing of application." See Phase 
I, AR, p. 46 (Exhibit marked S44, Electronic Rec., p. 991). Rather, the County published a 
"Notice of Hearing" in the local newspaper and mailed the same to landowners within one-mile 
of the proposed Big Sky site, excluding the Slones. 
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entitled landowners. In this case, the County actually mailed notice of the hearing to some 
landowners on July 17,2007, and amended notice on August 17,2007. In each instance, the 
County failed to provide notice to the Slones. It was only on September 14,2007, 11 days before 
the start of the public hearing and after the time period for written comments had closed, that the 
Slones received the same notice that all other landowners had received months prior. This 
cannot be considered timely under any circumstance. 
South View contends that the Slones waived their right to complain of due process 
violations by failing to appear at the hearing. South View's Brief, p. 27. South View fails to cite 
legal support for its waiver argument, likely because the premise of its contention represents a 
quintessential Catch-22. Under the Court's holding in Cowan, the Slones may have been 
precluded from complaining of their inadequate notice had they participated at the hearing. 
Cowan, 143 Idaho at 513. But according to South View, the Slones are similarly foreclosed 
because they did not appear at the hearing. The Court should not countenance this type of 
circular logic. 
The Slones were entitled to the protections afforded by procedural due process. The 
County violated these protections in three distinct ways, only one of which is contested. As to 
the one issue the opposing parties do contest, the record is clear that the County's failure to 
provide the Slones with timely, actual notice meant that they could not meaningfully participate 
in the Big Sky hearing under any application of the facts. These violations provide sufficient 
grounds for the Court to overturn the lower court and reverse the approval of the Big Sky CAFO 
permit. 
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V. I.e. § 67-6529 AND JCZO 13-6.02 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS 
ON SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS. 
The procedures adopted by the County pursuant to the limitations contained in I.C. § 67-
6529, and its embodiment in JCZO 13-6.02, were unconstitutional violations of substantive due 
process. Friends acknowledge that the Board "relaxed" the limitations ofthe one-mile rule for 
the two day hearing itself. In practice, however, the rule was inextricably intertwined with the 
earlier procedures promulgated by the Board. Under the auspices ofI.C. § 67-6529 and JCZO 
13-6.02, the County prohibited all written comments prior to the hearing from any individual or 
group residing outside of the one-mile exclusionary zone. 
Both Jerome County and South View implicitly acknowledge that Friends' substantive 
due process claim is colorable, but insist that no individual appellant had their substantive due 
process rights prejudiced because the one-mile rule was relaxed at the hearing. Jerome County's 
Brief, pp. 22-25; South View's Brief, pp. 30-31. Once again, the facts directly contradict the 
respondents' contentions.5 By way of example, a number of appellants were unconstitutionally 
prejudiced by operation of the one-mile rule. Harold and Carolyn Dimond, who own farmland 
contiguous with nearly one-mile of the Big Sky site, had their written comments turned away by 
Jerome County Planning and Zoning staff because they were not "primary residents" under the 
one-mile rule.6 Supp. Rec., Vol. I, pp. 191-93. Alma Hasse, executive director of ICARE, also 
5 In fact, South View effectively concedes that the one-mule rule was applied during the 
proceedings below. See South View's Brief, p. 25 (Slones' argument that they had right to 
meaningful participation "immaterial," because they were not property owners with a primary 
residence within one-mile of the proposed Big Sky site); p. 17 (admitting that one-mile rule was 
used to limit and define "affected persons"). 
6 Jerome County suggests that Harold Dimond has no standing to pursue a substantive due 
process claim because the Board asked him a few questions after his abbreviated testimony. 
Jerome County's Brief, p. 23. Both Harold and Carolyn Dimond, however, were denied the 
opportunity to present meaningful written testimony prior to the hearing pursuant to the 
limitations imposed under theone-mile rule, despite the fact that they own property contiguous 
with over one-mile of the Big Sky site. Phase I, Trans., pp. 220-21. 
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tried to submit a number of items to the County both prior to, and during, the hearing, but was 
similarly denied because she too was not a "primary resident" within one mile of the proposed 
Big Sky site. Aff. of Hasse, ~ 9. A number of the petitioners below were likewise precluded 
from submitting written comments pursuant to the one-mile rule, including the National Trust for 
Historic Preservation. See, e.g., Phase I, Vol. II, Exhibit marked as AG8-9, pp. 9-10 (Electronic 
Rec., pp. 918-19). Thus, contrary to the claims made by opposing parties, appellants' individual 
substantive due process rights were unconstitutionally violated by operation of I.C. § 67-6529.7 
The County and South View also assert that Friends improperly blend a petition for 
judicial review with an action for declaratory relief. Jerome County's Brief, p. 25; South View's 
Brief, pp. 32-33. Such argument misunderstands Friends' claim. Friends are seeking a ruling 
that the Board acted unconstitutionally by promulgating procedures which imposed a one-mile 
limitation on public commentary prior to the Big Sky hearing. Pursuant to I.C. § 67-5279(2)(a), 
affected persons are entitled to relief where a county has, among other things, acted in violation 
of constitutional provisions. Here, the Board violated the state and federal constitutions by 
enacting limitations which had no substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or 
general welfare. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,395 (1926). While 
the one-mile rule may be the genesis of those limitations, its imposition through the County's 
procedures is the unconstitutional act that deprived Friends of their substantive due process rights 
and concurrently prejudiced appellants' substantial rights under I.C. § 67-5279(4). See Eddins, 
150 Idaho at 36 (due process rights are substantial rights). As such, Friends are entitled to their 
requested relief. 
7 By extension, this issue is not moot. South View's Brief, p. 33. Jerome County did not 
eliminate the statute's restrictions on public presentation of evidence, but instead used the rule as 
justification to refuse written comments from those who were not "primary residents" within 
one-mile ofthe proposed CAFO site. Thus, a justiciable controversy still exists. 
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VI. THE BOARD FAILED TO FOLLOW ITS ZONING ORDINANCE. 
The County's CAFO zoning ordinance, JCZO Chapter 13, authorizes the permitting of 
new CAFOs only where (1) the site is zoned Agricultural A-I, (2) the application is compliance 
with the provisions of Chapter 13, and (3) the application is in compliance with the JCZO as a 
whole. JCZO 13-3.01. The arguments advanced by Jerome County and South View would read 
the third element out of the ordinance entirely and require mandatory permit issuance where an 
applicant has adhered only to the technical application requirements of Chapter 13. Jerome 
County's Brief, p. 28; South View's Brief, pp. 36,38. Such construction is incorrect for two 
reasons. 
First, the interpretation would improperly render a major portion of the ordinance 
superfluous. Chapter 13 unambiguously requires the Board to authorize a CAFO permit only 
where the application is in "compliance" with the JCZO. To be in "compliance" with the JCZO 
requires the Board to affirmatively consider and determine whether issuance of the CAFO permit 
would conform with the rules, goals, and standards governing the entire zoning process, 
including JCZO Chapter 1 and the comprehensive plan.8 The interpretation proffered by Jerome 
County and South View would negate this affirmative duty and render that portion of the 
ordinance meaningless.9 
8 JCZO Chapter 1 incorporates the goals of the comprehensive plan and, among other things, 
necessitates that permitting decisions not place an undue burden on neighboring landowner's 
rrivate property rights. 
Jerome County accuses Friends of"morphing" the standards of the ordinance. Jerome County's 
Brief, p. 28. The language used by Friends, however, comes directly from the decisions of Judge 
Bevan and Judge Elgee, who both found that Chapter 13-3.01 listed the substantive factors the 
Board must "consider in granting or denying an LCO permit." See Phase II, AR, p. 31; Elgee 
Dec., p. 34. Even the County adopted this reasoning in its Decision Upon Remand. Phase II, 
AR, p. 112. In fact, the County's argument strengthens Friends' contention that the Board was 
required to do something - whether that be "consider," "comply," "discuss," or any other verb -
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Second, this construction ignores the Board's actual actions in initially denying the Big 
Sky application. In its 2007 Memorandum Decision, the Board affinnatively determined that 
permit issuance would cause environmental problems due to the amount of manure and 
phosphate generated by the Big Sky CAFO once operational. See Phase I, AR, Exhibits Marked 
as CC49-CC50 (Electronic Rec., pp. 1944-45). Thus, the Board recognized that there were other 
factors outside of Chapter 13 that must be considered before granting a CAFO permit. Jerome 
County made this same argument before Judge Bevan, when it contended that: 
Certainly, the law (J CZO Chapter 13] was not envisioning the monkey or the rubber 
stamp, but was instead visualizing delineated and articulated community standards being 
considered and applied by the human element. One of the documents that delineates and 
articulates those community standards is the comprehensive plan .... Although Big Sky is 
correct in that it should be allowed to lawfully use or develop its property, it cannot do so 
at the risk of the health, safety and general welfare of others. 
Jerome County's Response Brief, pp. 6, 16, McFarland v. Jerome County, 2007-cv-1242 (Idaho 
5th Judicial District, J. Bevan). Jerome County once understood that the ordinance, as written, 
required the Board to consider whether the application was in "compliance" with the entire 
zoning ordinance, not just Chapter 13. The County should be estopped from making a contrary 
argument before this Court. 
The County also contends that the Board did consider whether the Big Sky application 
was in "compliance" with the JCZO in its 2008 Decision Upon Remand. See Jerome County's 
Brief, pp. 29-31. The County fails to cite any language that actually supports this assertion. 
Instead, it references a paragraph contained in the "DISCUSSION" section of the remand 
decision. Id. at 31. That paragraph does not indicate whether the Board ever made an 
affirmative determination that the Big Sky application complied with the whole of the JCZO. To 
the contrary, the paragraph unequivocally allows "the Board to reconsider all issues that it 
to affirmatively determine whether the application was in "compliance" with the JCZO. 
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previously had, or other issues overlooked." Phase II, AR, p. 112. 
Furthennore, there is no statement anywhere in the 2008 decision evidencing that the 
Board considered, let alone affinnatively determined, that the application was in compliance with 
the entire JCZO. See id. at 111-119. A close examination of the Decision Upon Remand reveals 
that the Board approved the Big Sky permit based solely on the technical application 
requirements of Chapter 13. See Phase II, AR, p. 113, 117 (application complies with thirteen 
technical requirements of 13-5.02); p. 114 (Big Sky CAFO situated in Agricultural A-I zone); 
pp. 115-117 (application meets provisions contained in 13-2.01). This contravenes the 
unambiguous requirements of the County's own ordinances. 
VII. APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES. 
The County tries to argue that it is entitled to attorney fees, but the facts do not support 
such a claim.1O This Court recently determined that the 2010 amendments to I.e. § 12-117 do not 
allow for the award of attorney fees in an appeal from an administrative action. Smith v. 
Washington County Idaho, 150 Idaho 388, __ , 247 P.3d 615, 618 (2010). The Court's holding 
in Smith is inapplicable here, however, because amendments to mandatory fee-shifting statutes 
may not be applied retroactively. Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85, 87 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(amendments to I.C. § 12-120, which mandates award of attorney fees in commercial 
transactions, could not be applied retroactively). I.C. § 12-117 is one example of a mandatory 
fee-shifting statute. Rincover v. State Dept. of Finance, 129 Idaho 442, 444 (1996). Thus, the 
2010 amendments to 1. C. § 12-117 and the Court's holding in Smith cannot be applied to this 
case. Moreover, the effective date of the amendments to I.C. § 12-117 is June 1,2009. This 
10 Friends acknowledge that they incorrectly cited Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 
Idaho 185,208 (1991) to support their proposition that amendments to a fee-shifting statute are 
not retroactive. As expressed infra, there is ample case law approving the same principle. 
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action was commenced on October 21, 2008, and the older version ofthe statute must necessarily 
apply. Walker v. Nationwide Financial Corp. 0/ Idaho, 102 Idaho 266, 268 (1981) (courts to 
interpret legislative action in a manner that wi]] not nul1ify language or make words superfluous). 
Under the prior version of I.C. § 12-117, an award of attorney fees against the County is 
warranted because it acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact in defending this case. See 
Fischer v. City o/Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356 (2005). In Fischer, fees were awarded against 
the City of Ketchum when the City, among other things, ignored the plain language of its 
ordinance. Id. Here, the County ignored the plain language of JCZO 13-3.01, which required the 
Board to determine whether the Big Sky application was "in compliance" with the whole JCZO. 
Furthermore, the County acted unconstitutionally by restricting public participation at the Big 
Sky hearing and violating the Slones' procedural due process rights. See Reardon v. Magic 
Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 120 (2004) (awarding fees against county where 
county's actions were unconstitutional). The County has also wasted precious judicial resources 
by making numerous unsupported attacks on Friends' statutory and constitutional standing. 
When viewed as a whole, Jerome County's actions in this matter ful1y support an award of 
attorney fees in Friends' favor. 
Judge Elgee recognized below that Friends acted with a reasonable basis in law and fact. 
Elgee Dec., p. 38. Judge Elgee specifically noted that "it is an open question in Idaho whether 
four minutes ofpublic comment satisfies due process." ld. Under any circumstances, an award 
of attorney fees against Friends is entirely unjustified. 
VIII. CONCLUSION. 
For the reasons stated above, Friends respectful1y requests that the Court reverse the 
District Court's denial ofthe petition for judicial review, vacate Jerome County's approval ofthe 
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Big Sky LCO, and remand for a new hearing that al10ws for meaningful public participation 
consistent with the Idaho and United States constitutions. 
Dated: August 30th, 2011. 
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